GDPR and Anti-Doping before the EU Court of Justice
Category: News
Advocate-General Spielmann delivers his opinion on the processing of personal data in the context of anti-doping regulations.
The Austrian anti-doping commissions National Anti-Doping Agentur Austria (‘NADA’) and Österreichische Anti-Doping Rechtskommission (‘OADR’) were planning to publish a list of athletes who infringed anti-doping rules on their respective websites. Specifically, the list would include the name of the athlete, the sporting discipline concerned, the duration of the suspension and the reason for the suspension. Such publication is provided for by the Austrian Anti-Doping Law, which aims to deter athletes from committing infringements of anti-doping rules and to prevent circumvention of the anti-doping rules by informing relevant persons about athlete suspensions.
Is such publication allowed under the General Data Protection Regulation (‘GDPR’)? Not according to four athletes, who challenged the decision before the Austrian Data Protection Authority and the Austrian Federal Administrative Court. The latter court raised this and other related questions before the EU Court of Justice and on 25 September 2025, Advocate General Spielmann (‘AG’) provided a first analysis of the facts of the case (C-474/24).
In brief, the AG determined that the publication is not necessary in light of the objectives pursued by the Austrian Law, because the published (personal) data goes beyond what is necessary to achieve the envisioned objectives. Alternative methods of publication, such as pseudonymising the name of the athlete and not including the specific substance or other identifying attributes, would suffice to achieve the objectives. Of course, the opinion by AG Spielmann is not a definitive interpretation and is subject to the analysis and subsequent decision by the Court of Justice, which is expected in the coming months.
Below is a summary of the most important findings of AG Spielmann’s opinion:
I.Material scope of GDPR
The first issue concerned the material scope of the GDPR, where article 2(2)(a) GDPR states that the GDPR does not apply to the processing of personal data in the course of an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law. AG Spielmann highlights the CJEU’s strict interpretation of this exception in order to ensure a broad data protection framework: only processing activities related to national security should be excluded from the GDPR’s material scope, for example essential State functions and fundamental interests of society. Even if ‘anti-doping activities’ are for EU Member States themselves to regulate and not the EU, the AG argues this is not sufficient to conclude that they can be classified as activities falling outside the scope of EU law and the GDPR.
II. The concept of health data in anti-doping context
The second issue concerned the extent to which information related to the health of a natural person can be qualified as “health data” as included in articles 4(15), 9(1) and recital 35 GDPR. Importantly, the processing of health data is by default prohibited under the GDPR, which means that the processing needs to be allowed by an exception listed in article 9 GDPR, on top of the other general obligations of the GDPR including article 6 GDPR that each processing activity needs to have a legal ground. In other words, should the concerned data be considered health data, one of the exceptions from article 9 GDPR would need to apply before allowing publication of the data on a website. In combination with the other obligations of the GDPR, such decision would set an important precedent within the sports industry.
AG Spielmann notes the CJEU’s broad interpretation of health data in case C-184/20: the possibility to indirectly reveal information about a person’s health status is sufficient, for example by means of “an intellectual operation involving collation or deduction”. Health data is considered by the AG to include (i) data generated in the medical context, including data in a medical record which is not necessarily health-related (e.g. administrative data intended to be included in the record); (ii) raw data from personal measurements (e.g. height, blood pressure) which, combined with other contextual information, allows inferences about health status; and (iii) membership of health-related groups such as those related to weight loss or alcohol addiction (with a reference to the Article 29 Working Party’s Guidelines in this respect).
Based on the AG’s assessment, it can be derived that the published data can constitute health data depending on the context. If there is a link – even indirect – between the published information and the health status of the athlete, the data constitutes health data under the GDPR. To determine the link, other contextual information about the athlete which is processed can be used. In this case, the AG argues that this link would be impossible to draw without mentioning the prohibited substance or its category. In this context it is relevant to also mention a similar case NADA and Others (C-115/22), where AG Capeta stated that the mere finding that an athlete consumed or was in the possession of certain prohibited substances says nothing about their health status.
III. Processing based on a legal obligation should still be proportional
Regardless of the classification as health data, any processing activity needs to have a legal ground under article 6(1) GDPR. NADA and OADR relied on the legal ground of processing necessary to comply with a legal obligation. The Austrian Anti-Doping Law holds that NADA has to provide several institutions and athletes of information free of charge, including suspensions and bans of athletes, stating the name of the athlete, duration of ban and reasons for ban, without it being possible to make inferences about special categories of personal data of the persons concerned. The OADR is tasked by the Law with conducting disciplinary proceedings for the competent federal sports federation in accordance with the anti-doping rules.
AG Spielmann took another view and first discussed the ‘necessity’ of the published information in light of the abovementioned objectives pursued by the law. In his opinion, publishing the substance or the athlete’s name are not necessary for the objective of public deterrence, and publishing the name for the objective of preventing circumvention of suspensions can be deemed necessary, but the publication then needs to be limited in scope and duration. Second, ‘proportionality’ similarly requires balancing the interference in the athlete’s private life with the need to pursue the objectives of the anti-doping rules, with the scope and duration of the publication as relevant factors.
If these conditions are not met, national anti-doping bodies cannot publish athlete’s personal data even if national law obliges them to. Even if national law determines (in part) the purpose and means of the data processing, it is still for the anti-doping bodies to carry out a proportionality assessment. In this case, this means carefully considering the method of publication and the existence of less intrusive methods such as pseudonymisation or limited disclosure of athlete’s information.
IV. Classification of the data as data concerning criminal offences or convictions
Article 10 GDPR does not prohibit the processing of data concerning criminal offences or convictions, but subjects it to enhanced scrutiny under specific conditions. The question was posed whether the published data can be considered such data. AG Spielmann concludes that regardless of the classification of the offences under national law, article 10 GDPR may apply if the convictions have a punitive purpose and a degree of severity equivalent to a criminal penalty. If article 10 GDPR applies, the data can only be published on a website under the control of an official authority or when the processing is authorised by national law providing for appropriate safeguards for the rights of – in casu – athletes.
V. Admissibility
A final issue concerned the admissibility of a complaint which was previously rejected as inadmissible. The data processing in casu took place while judicial proceedings were pending before the court, but not at the time of the complaint. AG Spielmann notes that the principles of equivalence and effectiveness of the remedy need to be respected, and the protection of the rights guaranteed by the GDPR need to be ensured, as well as the right to an effective remedy. The determining factor for a complaint to be admissible in these situations is whether the complaint is not purely hypothetical and lends itself to preventive or precautionary action by the supervisory authority. In other words, under article 77 GDPR (which allows data subjects to lodge a complaint with supervisory authorities) it remains possible for a complaint to be admissible even if the data processing did not yet exist or was not imminent at the time the complaint was lodged.
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