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10 Key Takeaways from the ECJ’s Seraing Judgment

Category: International Arbitration & Dispute Resolution

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On 1 August 2025, the Court of Justice of the EU (ECJ) issued its landmark judgment in RFC Seraing SA v. FIFA (Case C-600/23). In this newsflash, we break down ten critical questions and insights arising from the judgment.

In 2015, FIFA enacted a ban on Third-Party Ownership (TPO) – agreements whereby investors other than the player or their club could hold stakes in transfer fees.

That same year, R.F.C. Seraing, a Belgian football club, entered TPO agreements with a finance company (Doyen Sports), prompting FIFA to impose a player registration ban and a fine. These sanctions were largely upheld by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), which has jurisdiction to hear appeals against final decisions passed by FIFA and its bodies pursuant to the FIFA Statutes. Since the CAS is an arbitral tribunal with its seat in Switzerland, a petition for annulment of the CAS award was submitted to the Swiss Federal Tribunal which rejected the petition.

As a court of a non-EU Member State, the Swiss Federal Tribunal cannot request a preliminary ruling from the ECJ on matters of general EU law. In parallel, R.F.C. Seraing therefore brought proceedings against FIFA before the Belgian Courts, seeking a ruling that the ban on TPO was incompatible with fundamental EU law principles, including the rights of free movement of capital, freedom of movement of workers and freedom to provide services.

The Brussels Court of Appeal rejected the claim, holding that R.F.C. Seraing’s arguments had already been raised and rejected by the CAS, and that the CAS award – once upheld by the Swiss Federal Tribunal – had res judicata effect (meaning it was final and binding). In other words, the Belgian Court considered the dispute with FIFA definitively resolved, with no possibility of reopening or further judicial review.

R.F.C. Seraing then appealed to the Belgian Court of Cassation, which referred a question to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling (explained below).

In essence, the Court of Cassation asked whether EU law prevents national courts from giving res judicata effect to a CAS award (issued by an arbitral tribunal seated outside the EU, i.e. subject only to a challenge before a court of a non-EU Member State which cannot refer questions for preliminary rulings to the ECJ).

Put differently: was the Belgian Court of Appeal correct in rejecting R.F.C. Seraing’s claim and arguments on the basis of the principle of the res judicata of the arbitral award? Or does EU law require a judicial review of the CAS award (upheld by the Swiss Federal Tribunal) and, if so, how far must that review go?

The ECJ held that national courts of EU Member States must be able to carry out an “effective” review of CAS awards to ensure compatibility with EU public policy.

In particular, a CAS award cannot be treated as res judicata if:

  • the dispute involves the pursuit of sport as an economic activity within the EU; and

  • the award has not been subject to an “effective” review by a national court of an EU Member State for consistency with EU public policy.

This is the delicate part. In principle, an “effective” review does not require a full re-examination of the CAS award under EU law, nor does it mean that national courts of EU Member States must re-address all factual or legal questions.

The review by the national court is in principle limited, focusing specifically on whether the CAS-award complies with EU public policy. This includes EU competition rules and the freedoms of movement for workers, provision of services, and movement of capital guaranteed by Articles 45, 56 and 63 TFEU, respectively.

Where a CAS award involves EU public policy, national courts must be able to review the interpretation of these principles, the legal consequences of that interpretation, and the legal classification of the facts by the arbitration body.

An important novelty from the ECJ’s judgment is that national courts cannot simply find that an award is inconsistent with EU public policy and deny it recognition. The ECJ found that national courts must be able to assert jurisdiction and draw “all the appropriate legal conclusions where such an inconsistency is found to exist” (§103), such as ending conduct that breaches public policy and granting interim measures.

No. In practice, CAS awards concerning purely sports matters will generally remain final and are not subject to further judicial review before national courts of EU Member States.

Their finality is only limited when the arbitral award touches on principles and provisions which form part of EU public policy. 

The ECJ’s judgment also focuses on “compulsory arbitration”.

Because it is unilaterally imposed through FIFA’s statutes and regulations.

By becoming a member of FIFA, national associations, including clubs and players, must accept the jurisdiction of the CAS for dispute resolution. As a result, individuals and entities involved in football have no genuine choice but to agree to arbitration; it is a prerequisite to the participation in any FIFA-sanctioned competition.

Yes. The ECJ confirmed that mandatory sports arbitration can be justified by legitimate objectives.

However, it cannot prevent individuals from relying on EU law rights and freedoms, which form part of EU public policy.

The ECJ’s response is negative. The ECJ does not require CAS to move its seat from Switzerland to an EU Member State.

However, the ECJ’s decision is not binding in foreign jurisdictions. CAS awards declared valid at the seat (in Switzerland) could still be considered valid outside the EU. It is also unclear how the ECJ’s decision aligns with the obligations of EU Member States under the New York Convention to enforce valid arbitration agreements, as each of them is a signatory to that Convention.

Yes.

While an advocate general at the ECJ suggested in January 2025 that the New York Convention should not apply to mandatory sports arbitration such as CAS, the ECJ did not follow this point of view.

The New York Convention, however, requires the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements. The ECJ’s decision that a national court can have jurisdiction over the dispute in the event that the CAS award violates EU public policy sits at odds with the New York Convention.

Not directly. The judgment specifically targets mandatory sports arbitration, not voluntary commercial arbitration.

However, the ECJ reaffirmed a broader principle: arbitration cannot be used to bypass principles of EU public policy.

Commercial arbitral awards conflicting with EU public policy remain unenforceable under the New York Convention and may be annulled under Belgian law. These are long-established principles to which the Seraing judgment certainly gives new colouring.

If you have any questions about the Seraing judgment, its implications for (sports) arbitration, and how it may affect your legal strategies, please do not hesitate to contact us.

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