The Balogun case: Testing the boundaries of the Field of Play Doctrine
Category: Sports Industry
Much ink has already been spilled over the Balogun affair. The FIFA Disciplinary Committee's decision to suspend the automatic disqualification of US striker Folarin Balogun has drawn fierce political commentary, media scrutiny, and diplomatic controversy in equal measure. This insight will not engage with those dimensions. Instead, the purpose of this piece is narrower: what does the Balogun case reveal – and potentially challenge – about the Field of Play doctrine as developed by the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS)?
Key takeaways
The Balogun case tests the limits of the Field of Play doctrine, which generally protects refereeing decisions from review by FIFA judicial bodies and the Court of Arbitration for Sport.
While Balogun’s red card was an on-field decision, the resulting automatic one-match suspension affects a future match and may therefore fall outside traditional Field of Play immunity.
The case exposes a potential conflict within the FIFA Disciplinary Code between the power to place disciplinary measures on probation and the mandatory wording governing automatic suspensions.
Its outcome may clarify when FIFA can review or modify the consequences of a referee’s decision without reopening the on-field decision itself.
The Field of Play doctrine
The Field of Play (FOP) doctrine is one of the cornerstones of the lex sportiva. At its core, the doctrine holds that on-field officiating decisions, made by referees and officials in the course of applying the rules of the game, benefit from what the CAS has described as "qualified immunity" from external review. This immunity is justified by several considerations: the need to preserve the finality and certainty of sporting results, the authority of referees and match officials, the limited technical expertise of arbitral tribunals in reviewing sporting judgments, the need to avoid disruption to competitions, and the risk of opening the floodgates to challenges by dissatisfied participants seeking to rewrite sporting outcomes (see, inter alia, CAS 2015/A/4208; CAS OG 20/15 and CAS 2017/A/5373).
Once the FOP doctrine is engaged, any party seeking to challenge an on-field decision faces a high threshold. CAS will intervene only where the decision is affected by one of the limited recognized grounds for review, such as bad faith, fraud, bias, arbitrariness, corruption, or a fundamental error of law.
The two conditions for FOP immunity
CAS panels have distilled the FOP doctrine into two requirements that must both be satisfied.
First, the decision must originate from an official charged with applying the rules of the game on the playing field. This may also cover a decision by an appeal jury or similar review body where the applicable rules provide for an immediate or proximate review of the on-field decision (CAS 2017/A/5373).
Second, the effects of the decision must be confined to the field of play. CAS has made clear that FOP immunity does not extend to cases where “wider interests are concerned”, for instance where the decision entails a suspension from future matches or competitions (CAS 2017/A/5373).
The red card in the Balogun case: a hybrid decision?
The Balogun case sits at the difficult boundary of the FOP doctrine. The red card itself was plainly an on-field decision: it was taken by the referee, during the match, after a VAR review. However, Article 66(4) of the FIFA Disciplinary Code (FDC) attaches to that decision an automatic one-match suspension, affecting a future match.
The red card therefore has a hybrid nature. The expulsion belongs to the field of play; the automatic suspension arguably does not. It is not a sporting judgment made in real time, but a regulatory consequence prescribed by the FIFA rules. One could therefore argue that the suspension element does not fall strictly within the FOP doctrine and is, at least in principle, reviewable.
The caveat: "In so far as the rules of the game themselves provide"
There is, however, an important caveat to the FOP doctrine: its immunity applies only “in so far as the rules of the game themselves provide” (CAS 2017/A/5373).
In practical terms, the doctrine does not confer greater finality on an on-field decision than the applicable sporting rules themselves. Where those rules establish a mechanism for reviewing a referee’s decision, CAS will recognise and give effect to that mechanism. Conversely, where the rules declare the decision final, the competent judicial body cannot reopen it outside the defined exceptions provided by those same rules.
Applied to the Balogun case, this raises two distinct questions.
First, was the referee’s decision itself reviewable?
At first sight, the FDC grants the Disciplinary Committee broad procedural and substantive powers. Under Article 55 FDC, proceedings may be commenced based on several sources, including match officials’ reports, a protest, a request from a FIFA body, or ex officio. Article 56(2) FDC further provides that the Disciplinary Committee is responsible, inter alia, for sanctioning serious infringements that escaped the match officials’ attention, rectifying obvious errors in referees’ disciplinary decisions, and imposing additional sanctions.
However, those powers must be read together with Article 9(1) FDC, which provides that decisions taken by the referee on the field of play are final and may not be reviewed by FIFA’s judicial bodies. Article 9(2) establishes only a narrow exception where the referee’s decision involves an obvious error.
To date, the Disciplinary Committee has not provided any explanation indicating that the referee’s decision was affected by an obvious error.
Second, could the automatic suspension nevertheless be placed on probation?
Even if the red-card decision was reviewable, a distinct question arises as to whether the Disciplinary Committee could modify the disciplinary consequence attached to it.
Article 66(4) FDC provides that a sending-off “automatically incurs suspension from the subsequent match”, while Article 66(5) confirms that the suspension “must be served”, even where the subsequent match is subsequently abandoned, annulled, forfeited or replayed. The wording is therefore both automatic and mandatory.
Article 27 FDC appears to pull in the opposite direction. It permits a FIFA judicial body to place “disciplinary measures” on probation and does not expressly exclude automatic one-match suspensions from its scope.
The interpretative issue is therefore whether Article 27 operates as a general power applicable to all disciplinary measures, including the automatic suspension imposed under Article 66(4), or whether the specific and mandatory wording of Article 66 excludes the use of probation in this context.
CAS jurisprudence may provide useful guidance in assessing that tension.
In CAS OG 00/011, Andreea Răducan v. IOC, the Romanian gymnast challenged the loss of her Olympic gold medal after testing positive for a prohibited substance that had been administered inadvertently through medication given by her team doctor. The Anti-Coping Code provided that any positive test would automatically lead to the invalidation of the athlete’s result. Once the doping offence had been established, the panel considered itself bound by that rule and, relying on its “clear and unambiguous wording”, upheld the resulting disqualification, “severe as it may be”. As the panel observed, “automatic” means “following necessarily”.
If Article 27 applies generally to all disciplinary measures, the Committee may have modified the consequence without reopening the referee’s decision. If Article 66 requires the suspension to be served in all circumstances, however, placing it on probation would appear difficult to reconcile with the clear wording of the rules and, consequently, with the FOP doctrine itself.
Conclusion
The Balogun controversy illustrates why regulatory precision is essential. The FOP doctrine is intended to ensure that competitions are decided on the field, rather than reconstructed through subsequent disciplinary proceedings or litigation. Yet that objective can be achieved only where the applicable rules clearly identify which decisions are final, which consequences remain reviewable, and how apparently conflicting disciplinary powers interact. Without such clarity, the disciplinary process risks reintroducing the very uncertainty that the doctrine is designed to prevent.